Introduction
In the late fourteenth century, China's Ming dynasty was annoyed by persistent raids by Japanese pirates on the Chinese coast. The successive emperors attempted to crack down on them but ultimately failed, because the pirates were too agile, remote, and hence elusive. In their search for an alternative countermeasure, the Ming dynasty, on several occasions, dispatched an envoy to Japan's secular Muromachi shogunate. In exchange for a tributary status that actually brought enormous economic profits to the Japanese shogunate, China requested Japan to suppress the piracy. Japan's shogunate kept its word.
1 Shortly after the so-called tally trade was initiated between the two countries, piratical activities waned substantially. 2 This is a practice of indirect policing that this article is wholly concerned with.
Instances of indirect policing can also be found in the contemporary period. The increasing consumption of illegal drugs has been a long-standing concern for the U.S. To curb the supply of drugs in an effective manner, the U.S. forged security partnerships with Colombia and Mexico, both of which were major roots and routes of narcotic trafficking (Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative). 3 These partnerships aimed at assisting the governments of Colombia and Mexico financially and militarily in their campaigns against drug cartels.
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These two episodes suggest that even a superpower has to rely on a third party to wipe out transnational perpetrators if they are harbored beyond her reach. The very reason for her reliance is the third party's influence over transnational perpetrators. However, indirect policing is not always functional.
In her pursuit of Operation Enduring Freedom, for instance, the U.S. has deployed combat drones in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Yemen, and Somalia, instead of relying on the sovereign authorities of these regions, to defeat al-Qaeda, Taliban, and their associates. 5 Despite accumulating collateral damage and accompanying protests from the local populace, the U.S. has still been fixated on the drone tactics there. 6 In contrast with the indirect form, we call this direct policing, whereby the targeted or victimized state herself conducts security campaigns against perpetrators. Recent counter-piracy campaigns to protect merchant vessels off the Somali coast constitute another instance of direct policing (Combined Task Force 151). Reuter, Crawford, and Cave. 1988 . 5 Scahill 2013. 6 The U.S. is helping to breed a new generation of enemies in Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan and throughout the Muslim world. Scahill 2013, 104, 177, 518. 7 Since the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816 was adopted in 2008, the Permanent Five and several other states have sent their navies to the Gulf of Aden.
A comparison of indirect and direct policing raises thought-provoking questions, which we will tackle in this article.
Why do we observe indirect policing in some instances but direct policing in others? When does indirect policing outperform direct policing, and vice versa?
To address these questions, we must identify the factors that hamper direct policing and find out how they can be overcome by indirect policing. However, the literature merely posits that indirect deterrence (connoting indirect policing in our language) can work because it exploits a third party's influence-without exploring the sources of its influence. 8 In contrast, we aim to uncover the black box of indirect policing. Namely, we will pin down the obstacles to direct policing, illuminate the unexplored mechanism of indirect policing, and then illustrate how indirect policing overcomes the obstacles.
To carry out these missions, we take classical (rational) deterrence theory as a baseline framework to conduct our analyses. Building upon the classical theory, we aim to make our theory accessible to scholars in the field and our innovation clear. While acknowledging long-standing criticisms of it, we appreciate the classical theory to be a handy analytical tool as well as a useful policy guide to counteract the Cold-War adversaries. 9 However, the classical theory becomes deficient in dealing with the so-called "new" threats and other kinds of transnational perpetrators such as terrorist networks, crackers, pirates, drug cartels, and arms smugglers, because they have novel characteristics that the classical theory does not presume. We do not just enumerate these characteristics but also embed them into our theoretical framework to show how they interrupt deterrence. In this sense, we will revitalize the classical theory by adapting it to diversifying threats.
To counteract the diversifying threats, various measures of deterrence have been developed (e.g., deterrence by delegitimization, tailored deterrence), while traditional measures have also been rehabilitated (cumulative deterrence, deterrence by denial Davis and Jenkins 2004; Miller 2013; Whiteneck 2005. 9 For criticisms of classical deterrence theory, see George and Smoke 1974; George and Smoke 1989; Jervis 1970; Jervis 1976; Jervis 1979; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; Lebow 1981; Lebow 1984; Lebow 2005; Lebow and Stein 1987; Lebow and Stein 1989; Lebow and Stein 1990; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Stein 1987. 10 For deterrence by delegitimization, see Long & Wilner 2014; Wilner 2011; for tailored deterrence, see Bowen 2004; Knopf 2008; Morgan 2009; Payne 2001 ; for cumulative deterrence, see Almog 2004; Feldman 1982: 67; Lieberman 1994; Morgan 2003 ; for deterrence by denial, see Freedman 2004:36-40; Snyder 1961; Wilner 2011. 11 For a discussion on preemption and deterrence, see Freedman 2004, 84-108; Sandler and Siqueira 2006. Preemption and deterrence will be expounded in Section III.
targeted or victimized state (e.g., Ming China of the lead episode) may not observe which measure between preemption and deterrence is actually deployed by the executor of policing (Muromachi Japan). Schelling 1966, 2-6. 13 Incidents of deterrence failure will be presented in Section V. If they do not constitute complete failures, they amount to partial successes at best. Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 24. 14 Throughout the article, we assign the feminine pronoun ("she") to Defender, the masculine one ("he") to Proxy, and the plural one ("they") to Perpetrators, respectively. 15 The positive theory of vicarious sanction explains why an innocent (Proxy in our context) is sanctioned for others' (Perpetrators') misdeeds. There are three accounts of vicarious sanction: functional, informational, and preferential ones. Nakao 2011. From among these, we adopt the functional account, which justifies a punishment on an innocent by his capabilities of influencing Perpetrators. Levinson 2003 . The preferential account holds that deterrent effects can be expected if punishments are vicariously inflicted on Perpetrators' families and kinsmen whom they deeply cherish. Namely, this mechanism exploits Perpetrators' altruistic concerns toward others. Israel's house demolition tactic against suicide terrorism suits this account. Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor 2015. Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 27 . According to the informational account, if it is impossible to identify Perpetrators, effective deterrence necessitates a punishment on all the suspects or at least some of them selected at random. 
I. Theory of Deterrence against "New" Threats
One of the primary purposes of this article is to develop an informal theory of policing (preemption and deterrence) against adversaries with novel characteristics that are beyond classical deterrence theory's presumption. Nonetheless, our theory is still built upon the classical theory, so that it is accessible to scholars in the field and so that our innovation is contrasted with existing arguments. Before introducing our theory, we briefly review the classical theory and reveal its deficiency in dealing with the so-called "new" threats such as crackers and terrorist networks.
Classical Deterrence Theory
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The simplest form of deterrence postulates two players (Defender and Attacker) and proceeds in the following scenario:  Capability. Defender has the means to inflict unbearable damages on Attacker.
While applicable to adversaries of the Cold-War era (i.e., the Soviet Union and her allies), this theory offers poor guidance for designing a countermeasure against the new threats, as demonstrated below.
Updating Classical Deterrence Theory
As we apply the classical theory, a failure of deterring some new threats implies one of the two possibilities: in one, Defender's two tasks above (threatening and punishment) are hampered by some characteristics of the new threats; in the other, an additional task is required to deter them. Neither possibility can be denied, given the new threats' three possible features below:
First, unlike the Cold-War adversaries, the new threats are often so decentralized and/or disorganized that they cannot fulfill their unified will throughout the group or network. 18 That is, even when their leadership is deterred, their peripheral elements may not. Second, they are so obscure that they can hardly be identified and also that what they hold dear ("return address") can hardly be detected. That means, the informational problem hinders deterrence of the new threats. Third, they are so fanatical that they have no or little secular value to hold dear. 19 Namely, they lack the target of punishment. Because of these features, we distinguish the new threats from the Cold-War adversaries by labeling them Perpetrators, instead of Attacker, in the subsequent theoretical context. We assume Perpetrators to be non-state groups or individuals.
Among the three features above, the informational problem in particular indicates that Defender must conduct an additional task for deterrence-investigation-to identify the culprit and find out what he holds dear. 20 Accordingly, Defender must thus possess an additional qualification-well-functioning 17 For the qualifications for a deterrer, see Bowen 2004, 59; Harvey 1998; Lebow 1981, 85-89; Levy 1988, 486; Wilner 2011, 31 . The qualifications are closely associated with the following four variables: (i) balance of military forces; (ii) balance of interests; (iii) reputation or behavior in past crises; (iv) signaling behavior. Huth 1999. For further discussions on (i), see Huth and Russett 1988; Mearsheimer 1983; on (ii) 20 Investigation should be fulfilled between (2) aggression and (3) punishment in the scenario of classical but is abstracted away from the classical theory.
Moreover, for Defender to implement the three tasks above, three qualifications for Perpetrators as deterrees are also needed, as listed below:
 Unity. Perpetrators are well-centralized and organized that they can make and fulfill a collective decision as if they were a unitary actor.
 Visibility. Perpetrators retain a certain degree of transparency in that if aggression takes place,
Perpetrators will be identified with sufficient likelihood, and their return addresses detected.
 Return address. Perpetrators have a value to hold dear that is sizable and damageable.
These qualifications were largely overlooked during the Cold-War era, presumably because the then targets of U.S. deterrence were almost exclusively the Soviet Union and its allies, which trivially met these qualifications. However, the qualifications have drawn attention in recent decades, because scholars and policymakers shifted their attention from the Cold-War adversaries to more diverse threats, whose novel characteristics nullified traditional deterrence tactics.
Updated Deterrence Theory in Summary
At bottom, our theory dictates to the deterrer three tasks-threatening, investigation, and punishment. To do them, the deterrer must satisfy four qualifications-resolve, communication, intelligence, and
capability-while the deterree must also satisfy three qualifications-unity, visibility, and return address.
We next investigate the new threats' characteristics that impair their qualifications as deterrees.
II. Obstacles to Deterring "New" Threats
While there are no academic definitions of the "new" threats, they commonly include "rogue" states, rebel organizations, terrorist networks, and crackers (i.e., malicious hackers). 22 By analyzing their novel characteristics, we address why some of them are difficult to deter.
Below we itemize the new threats' characteristics that disqualify them as deterrees and hence hamper
Defender's three tasks for deterrence.
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 Agility. Perpetrators moving and roving agilely (e.g., rebels and terrorists waging a guerrilla war)
may not be easily detected and grasped. Agility also raises the cost of punishment by expanding the risk of collateral damages (as with hellfire missiles launched from combat drones flying in Pakistan).
Obstructive to: investigation; punishment.
deterrence theory. 21 Bowen 2004, 68; Gray 2003, 453; Levy 1988; Wilner 2011, 31. 22 For discussion on the "new" threats, see Lupovici 2010. 23 While the qualifications for the deterree are derived in theory, the new threats' characteristics are cataloged in the practical context. it is committed without deliberation (e.g., a cracker's tapping of F5 for Denial-of-Service attacks).
Obstructive to: punishment. Their effects on the three tasks for deterrence are summarized in Table 1 . 28 Mapping of the characteristics onto the four archetypal adversaries (i.e., "new" threats) is shown in Table 2 . 29 The information in Tables 1 and 2 is further sorted out for each adversary in Table 3 , revealing which adversaries are difficult to deter and reasons therefor. According to Table 3 , terrorist networks and crackers are presumably much less likely to be deterred than rogue states and rebel organizations, because the former embrace more critical characteristics than the latter.
Note that the effects of these characteristics on deterrence are determined not solely by Perpetrators per se but by their relations to Defender as a deterrer. That means, these effects can be weakened if the deterrer is replaced with another party. On these grounds, indirect policing has a potential for deterring or policing elusive Perpetrators when they are deemed directly undeterrable.
[Insert 
III. Mechanism of Indirect Policing
Given the obstacles to deterrence above, it is critical to ask how to overcome them. We maintain that indirect policing has a potential for doing so. To show this, below we delineate the mechanism of indirect policing. practice when a second strike is expected. In such a case, one can prevent the second strike by the current culprit and simultaneously deter others' challenges through the demonstration effect. We term it policing to refer collectively to preemption and deterrence, while distinguishing them explicitly in Table 4 .
[Insert Figure 1 .]
[Insert Table 4 .]
Preemption vs. Deterrence
The distinction between preemption and deterrence has been neglected in the context of indirect deterrence, possibly because they are often indistinguishable to Defender; that is, Defender may not 31 In particular, negative inducement by threats of force is termed "compellence. " Schelling 1966, 69- One is procedural constraints associated with domestic politics, laws, and ethics that must be cleared before forces are engaged. Because preemption hastily exerts violence, the decision to resort to it must be deliberate. Another drawback is the possibility of reprisal that may arise as a consequence of preemption.
Moreover, preemption requires the detection of force, instead of value, as targets.
In sum, given the failures of deterrence and resulting exchanges of violence across the Third World, 35 it appears nonsensical to unconditionally favor deterrence against preemption. Even for terrorists' acquisition and use of WMD against which deterrence seems successful at least so far, a preemptive measure will possibly be an urgent requirement in the future. Reliance solely on deterrence always has a certain amount of risk and can cause great danger.
IV. Advantages
In light of Perpetrators' obstructive characteristics, 36 Defender can hardly fulfill the three tasks for deterrence. It then makes sense for Defender to rely on a third party (Proxy) who is in a better position to influence Perpetrators. There appears indirect policing as a serious choice. Although the literature finds the merit of indirect deterrence in the third party's influence, the sources of the influence have not been elucidated in a systematic manner. 37 By exploiting the positive theory of vicarious sanction, we offer a functional account of why Proxy can be more influential on Perpetrators than Defender and more fundamentally why indirect policing can outperform direct policing (which includes direct deterrence).
Below we explore the sources of influence that are closely associated with the three tasks for deterrence. 33 The problem of unobservable behavior is what economists call "moral hazard" discussed in Section VI. As to the lead episode about Japanese piracy, China's Ming government seemed indifferent to how Japan's shogunate stopped the piracy in question. 34 
Proxy as a Liaison: Communicative Advantage
Proxy has the advantage of communicating with Perpetrators, which can be explained a threefold manner.
The first argument concerns the credibility of threats. value system could be difficult for Defender to comprehend due to cultural, historical, political, or religious cleavages, it might not be so for Proxy who shares similar ascriptive backgrounds with
Perpetrators. This distance in value can affect the cost and accuracy of detecting the target of punishment.
Proxy as an Executor: Offensive Advantage
Proxy also has the advantage for both preemption and punishment. Because Proxy is geographically close to Perpetrators, he may fulfill both preemptive and punitive operations effectively and efficiently.
In contrast, Defender plausibly suffers physical obstacles. On the contrary, Defender must face difficulties with imposing punishments because of the physical distance. A punishment farther away from its target takes more cost and time. Such "off-shore"
deterrence is known to be much less effective, because the cost of mobilizing forces casts doubt on the credibility of threats and also because tardy punishments are not so threatening for impatient or present-minded deterrees.
45
Superiority of Indirect Policing
For the reasons above, even when direct policing is difficult for Defender, she can still police
Perpetrators by controlling Proxy if he possesses the three functional advantages delineated above. In addition, because Proxy is more likely to be rational, communicative, visible, and sensitive to incentives than Perpetrators, Proxy is presumably easier for Defender to handle than Perpetrators, indicating another rationale for indirect policing. To summarize, indirect policing enables Defender to amplify her influence on Perpetrators by exploiting Proxy's functional advantages.
V. Taxonomy of Policing with Associated Incidents
The practice of policing transnational Perpetrators can be categorized into four forms. We delineate them with associated historical and contemporary incidents.
Proper Direct Policing
42 Schofield 2014. 43 By threats of cheap but effective punishments such as ostracism and boycotting, even non-state Proxy such as peers and kinsmen can influence Perpetrators. In fact, informal social groups exert various kinds of punishments to discipline members. Hechter 1987 . Nakao 2011 For graduated deterrence, see Buzzard 1956; Freedman 2004, 35; Nitze 1956. 45 While the immediate or short-term balance of forces favors the defender, the long-term balance of forces does not. Huth and Russett 1988. Scahill 2013, 78 . 47 Long before Plan Colombia, successive U.S. administrations have assisted the Colombian government in prosecuting the War on Drugs (e.g., Andean Initiative of 1990), but its assistance was punctuated when the Colombian government was uncooperative, notably when Ernesto Samper (implicated in the Proceso 8000 scandal) was in power. This change of U.S. attitude toward Colombia indicates that the U.S. attempts to manipulate Colombia's anti-drug policies through incentives. 48 Joint Special Operations Task Force -Philippines 2011: "U.S. forces are temporarily deployed to the Philippines in a strictly non-combat role to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines." meanwhile he pressured Palestinian President Yasser Arafat to stop it by conditioning the negotiation for peace on the cessation of terrorist attacks. 49 The lead episode about China and the Japanese pirates in the Medieval era also illustrates dual policing. While China's Ming government repeatedly requested Japan's shogunate to control the pirates, 50 China herself fought and effectively defeated them in 1419, after which the Japanese piratical activities declined drastically.
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Note that the three forms of policing listed above are conceptually distinctive, but their boundaries are practically ambiguous. As the incidents below imply, Defender often controls the degree of her direct involvement, depending on how effectively Proxy can police Perpetrators. In its pursuit of Operation Enduring Freedom, for instance, the U.S. has deliberately chosen the extent of its own military engagements, based on the power of the local authorities and the severity of insurgency. Its engagement is intensive in Yemen and Somalia-as exemplified by the deployment of combat drones-but very moderate in the Philippines-as restricted mainly to advising and training. 52 In addition, the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, as the regional security stabilizes, can be interpreted as the transition from dual policing to a proper indirect one in our language. 53 The subsequent re-deployment of the U.S. Air Force to counter the rise of ISIL in Iraq and Syria can also be seen as the transition in reverse. It is not very meaningful to ask when the transition is complete. It is rather a matter of degree to balance between direct and indirect policing.
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Reciprocal Policing
If Perpetrators are dispersed across several states, international cooperation is urgently required to police them, because every state has severe legal, physical, and economic constraints in fighting abroad. It thus makes sense that these states establish a mechanism of reciprocal policing to enhance security. As a state joins the mechanism, it is liable for protecting other states from transnational perpetration originating from its domain, while being protected by other states elsewhere. 55 Namely, each state assumes the roles 49 Miller and Wines 2002. 50 Japan's shogunate had originally refused China's requests during his civil strife and initiated a piracy expedition only after the shogunate achieved its political reunification, suggesting that Proxy's local influence is one of the critical determinants in shaping the form of policing. So 2004, 3-4. China's diplomacy ultimately worked. Tanaka 2012, 76. 51 Tanaka 2012, 77. 52 In Yemen, the U.S. adopted indirect measures as well as direct ones. Scahill 2013, 65, 234-236, 322, 386 . Even in Somalia, the U.S. aided the government that failed long ago. Scahill 2013, 476 . Nonetheless, we regard these instances as proper direct policing, because direct policing overwhelms the indirect form there. 53 U.S. commitments to these states are articulated in the U.S. 
VI. Disadvantages
Though we have so far emphasized the advantages of indirect policing, it also has several potential disadvantages, which would not arise if Defender could directly police Perpetrators.
Difficulties in Communication
The first disadvantage lies in the difficulties associated with communication. Indirect policing relies on
Defender's inducement of Proxy in Phase I, but other things being equal, inducement is presumably more difficult than deterrence, because unlike deterrence inducement must specify the "when," "what" and "how" of the demanded behavior. 62 This complexity of message could cause a failure in communication.
Moreover, indirect deterrence (but not indirect preemption) necessitates two-phase communication- Clarke and Knake 2010, 270 : "Non-state actors will be a problem for cyber arms control, but CWLT should shift the burden of stopping them to the states party to the convention. Nations would be required to rigorously monitor for hacking originating in their country and to prevent hacking activity from inside their territory." CWLT remains hypothetical yet but is an apparent application of our reciprocal policing to fighting cyber-crimes. 
Disincentives for Policing
The second disadvantage is the disincentives for policing. When Defender cannot directly monitor Proxy's policing effort and behavior, he would be tempted to shirk his policing in the hope that the shirking would not result in Defender's sanction ("moral hazard"). Unverifiability of compliance is one of the major reasons that the U.S. has been a consistent opponent of cyber arms control. 65 The disincentive problem would also be relevant when several states conduct reciprocal policing, where each state enjoys only a fraction of its own contribution ("free-rider problem"). 66 As with Five Eyes, a selective membership might alleviate this problem.
Destabilization of Proxy's Regime
The third disadvantage concerns the possibility that Defender's intervention causes political turmoil in Defender's loss of influence there. In fact, the U.S. experienced the downfall of its sympathizer administrations and the rise of its challengers in the third world-Iraq, 69 Cuba, 70 Libya, 71 South
In sum, the disadvantages of indirect policing are difficulties in communication, disincentives for policing, and destabilization of Proxy's regime caused by corruption and tyranny. Those factors potentially constrain indirect policing's applicability and undermine its effectiveness.
VII. Conclusion
Classical deterrence theory holds that deterrence by punishment comprises threatening and punishment.
To execute these tasks, the targeted or victimized state (Defender) must satisfy three (Table 5 ). Defender's three tasks for deterrence can be hampered by the new threats' characteristics-agility, easiness of perpetration, foreign sovereignty, geography, intrinsic value, language, and plurality as well as the lack of C3 system and representative-that impair the qualifications for deterrees (Table 1) . Mapping of these characteristics onto various types of threats informs us whether they are deterrable by punishment (Tables 2 and 3 ) and also guides us in finding a suitable 72 The Iranian Revolution of 1979 purged the secular emperor and brought about the anti-American Shi'a regime. 73 The Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979 resulted in the collapse of the pro-American Somoza dynasty. The Soviet-oriented Sandinistas (FSLN) took power and even supported the left-wing guerrilla organization (FMLN 77 It is apparently too hasty to attribute these regime changes solely to U.S. intervention, but at the same time, it is probably too naïve to deny the U.S. influence in these regions. 78 Proponents and those in favor of deterrence include: Achen and Snidal 1989; Danilovic 2001; Harvey 1995; Harvey 1998; Huth 1988a; Huth 1988b; Huth 1990; Huth and Russett 1984; Huth and Russett 1988; Huth and Russett 1990; Huth and Russett 1993; Lieberman 1994; Signarino and Tarar 2006. countermeasure against them. We hope that our theoretical framework will contribute to the future discussion on how to counteract diversifying threats.
With recognition of the novel characteristics inherent in the new threats, we maintain that the obstacles to deterring them can be overcome if Defender-instead of directly deterring Perpetrators-makes use of a third party (Proxy) who is in a better position to influence Perpetrators. 79 We call these tactics by
Defender indirect policing rather than indirect deterrence on the grounds that policing consists of preemption and deterrence ( Despite its functional advantages, indirect policing is no panacea. It has at least three distinct disadvantages articulated as follows: (x) difficulties in communication regarding compellence and Chinese whispers; (y) disincentives for policing (commonly known as moral hazard and free-rider problem); (z) destabilization of Proxy's regime caused by corruption and tyranny. Reverting to the question of when indirect policing outperforms its direct counterpart, we maintain that the relative success of indirect policing hinges on which advantages or disadvantages are critical in its operation. The pros and cons of each counter-perpetration policy should be fairly assessed when policymakers adopt one among alternatives.
As we have shown, indirect policing is far from rare in history but has been largely neglected in the literature. We shed light on its mechanism and build its informal theory upon empirical grounds. With the rise of transnational perpetrators-a trend that, we believe, is very likely to continue in the future-indirect policing should be theoretically more refined, empirically more scrutinized, and perhaps practically more institutionalized. 
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